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TRANSCRIPTS
DEMOCRACY, FOOT VOTING, AND THE CASE FOR
LIMITING FEDERAL POWER
Ilya Somin*
I. INTRODUCTION
I would like to start by thanking the University of Montana School of
Law and the Montana Law Review for organizing this exciting symposium
and for honoring me with the invitation to deliver this keynote speech. I
also welcome this opportunity to visit the great state of Montana for the first
time ever. I notice that you now actually have much nicer weather than we
usually do in Washington, D.C., which is a pleasant surprise.
Tonight, I will focus on some important issues related to the subject of
the Symposium: federalism and limitations on federal government power.
In particular, I will suggest that in discussing these issues, we don’t pay
enough attention to the relationship between federalism and voting with
your feet. Paying proper attention to this connection strengthens the case for
de-centralizing political power to lower levels of government. It should also
affect our attitude toward judicial enforcement of federalism-based limits
on the power of the central government.
In first part of the presentation, I will briefly discuss what voting with
your feet is, and how it works. I will then describe how increasing opportu-
nities for foot voting can enhance our political freedom. Empowering foot
voters to decide on more issues will also enhance how well informed their
* Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. This article is adapted from my
keynote address at the Montana Law Review’s Browning Symposium on the Future of Federalism at the
University of Montana on October 2, 2014.
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decisions are relative to deciding those same issues purely through more
conventional voting.
Later in the presentation, I will note some possible limitations of foot
voting. They are genuine problems, but not nearly as severe as many people
claim.
Finally, towards the end, I consider the implications of all this for con-
stitutional federalism and for the appropriateness of judicial review of fed-
eralism issues for the purpose of enforcing limits on the power of the cen-
tral government.
II. WHAT IS FOOT VOTING?
First things first. What is this voting with your feet or, as I call it in
much of my work, “foot voting”?
At least as I use it in my work, “foot voting” denotes situations where
we can choose what sort of government or policy we want to live under by
deciding where we want to live, and, for example, we can do so by choos-
ing among different states. Many people, for instance, historically migrated
to Montana for reasons like this. You can also exercise foot voting when
you choose what local government to live under. In addition, one can vote
with their feet in the private sector. We do so every day when we decide
what sorts of products to buy or what kind of civil society organizations we
want to be associated with, such as a church or a synagogue or a private
school, professional association, and so forth. I have elaborated on this in
greater detail in my book, Democracy and Political Ignorance,1 which
came out last year and also in the more recent work about the relationship
between federalism and political freedom.2
Although it is called “foot voting,” in some cases it does not require
any actual movement. In the private sector, we can often vote with our feet
without actually physically going anywhere. You can pick up the phone or
go to a website, and get a different service provider or join a new civil
society organization.
What differentiates foot voting from conventional ballot-box voting is
the fact that it is an individual choice as opposed to a joint decision that you
make with thousands or millions of other people where your vote is just one
of a great many others. This distinction is crucial to the advantages of foot
voting that I focus on later in tonight’s presentation.
1. Ilya Somin, Democracy and Political Ignorance: Why Smaller Government is Smarter (Stan-
ford U. Press 2013).
2. Ilya Somin, Foot Voting, Federalism, and Political Freedom, in Nomos LV: Federalism and
Subsidiarity 83 (James Fleming & Jacob Levy eds., N.Y.U. Press 2014).
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III. FOOT VOTING AND POLITICAL FREEDOM
Foot voting in a federal system can play a vital role in enhancing our
political freedom. Most Americans have read the Declaration of Indepen-
dence where it says governments “[derive] their just powers from the con-
sent of the governed.”3 But too often we do not reflect very much on what
that means. We tend to assume that the consent of the governed and politi-
cal freedom more generally can be achieved through ballot-box voting. If
we get to vote for who is in government, that means we have political free-
dom. It also means that we have consented to the government’s policies.
Unfortunately, however, that is an inadequate account of both political
freedom and the consent of the governed. In a sense, you are indeed exer-
cising political freedom when you go to the ballot box and choose between
A and B, Democrats and Republicans, or whatever third parties might hap-
pen to be on the ballot. But it is a very peculiar kind of freedom, because
the chance that your vote will make a difference to the outcome of the
election is infinitesimally small. In an American presidential election, the
chance that your vote will have a decisive effect is about 1 in 60 million.4 In
state or local elections, it is higher than that but still extremely low.
With most other important freedoms, we would not consider that the
freedom is in any way meaningful if your chance of actually making a dif-
ference is 1 in 60 million or even 1 in 60,000. Take religious freedom: if
you only had a 1 in 60 million chance of being able to determine what
religion you want to practice, we would not say that you have meaningful
religious freedom. Further, if you only have a 1 in 60 million chance of
being able to determine what sorts of opinions you can express in your
speech, we would not believe that you have genuine freedom of expression.
The same goes for other important forms of freedom.
With respect to political freedom, this suggests that the degree of polit-
ical freedom you have, when your only way of exercising it has just a 1 in
60 million chance of making a difference—or even a 1 in 60,000 or a 1 in
10,000 chance—is extremely limited and grossly inadequate. That does not
mean that the vote is completely worthless. We would probably be even
less free without it. But it is far from sufficient.
Voting with your feet greatly diminishes this problem. When you de-
cide whether you want to live in Montana or some other state, or whether
you want to live in this city or one of the other cities within the same state,
that is a decisive individual choice. Even if 6,000 other people or 60 million
3. Declaration of Independence [¶ 2] (1776).
4. Andrew Gelman et al., What Is the Probability that Your Vote Will Make a Difference? 50
Econ. Inquiry 321, 323–324 (2012).
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other people do not agree with you, you still get to decide which of these
sets of government policies you want to live under.
Granted, many of you, like me, are married. Obviously my wife might
be able to veto my choice. And probably will. Her judgment is better than
mine. But, even so, 1 vote out of 2, or 1 vote out of 5 or 10 or 15, if you
have a large family, that still is much more meaningful than 1 vote out of
10,000 or 1 vote out of 10 million.
Your chances of exercising genuinely meaningful freedom are much
greater when you vote with your feet than when you vote at the ballot box.
Foot voting is more like the way we exercise other freedoms that we con-
sider important—freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and others—and
less like the very ephemeral kind of freedom where all we can do is make a
decision that has almost no chance of actually making any difference.
We reach the same conclusion when we focus on the question of con-
sent. Is it really meaningfully consensual when we choose our government
at the ballot box? It is difficult to argue that you have genuinely consented
to the outcome in any meaningful way when all you have done is make a
decision that has only a tiny little chance of making any difference.
Some people argue that the very fact that you voted means that you
have given your consent to the resulting government policies.5 I don’t think
this actually follows in any significant way. For one thing, the government
still claims authority over you even if you haven’t voted. If you choose not
to vote, you can’t then say, “Well, any laws made by the winners, they
won’t be binding on me.” So if it’s not even a meaningful choice in that
sense, it severely undercuts the validity of the argument.
In addition, even if you did vote, it may be that you voted not because
you consented to the overall structure of the system but simply because the
system is in place. At least in the short run, there’s nothing you can do to
change it, so you say, “Well, at least I want to vote for the lesser of the two
evils that happens to be on offer.” But that doesn’t mean you’ve actually
consented to either one of the evils in place; it just means that the choice is
before you, and you have decided to make a decision between them, but it’s
not really meaningful consent to any significant degree.
On the other hand, when you choose to vote with your feet, you do
have a meaningful opportunity to make a choice that makes a real differ-
ence. You also have a potentially wider range of options before you: hun-
dreds of different cities, and 50 different states. If it is a choice in the pri-
vate sector, there are even more options.
5. For good reviews and critiques of these sorts of arguments, see A. John Simmons, Moral Prin-
ciples and Political Obligations 91–93 (Princeton U. Press 1979) and Michael Huemer, The Problem of
Political Authority 22–35 (Palgrave Macmillan 2013).
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Even with respect to federal government policies, one can argue that at
least you consented to live in the country as a whole, because you have not
left. That is a kind of “tacit consent.” But obviously the burden of having to
leave the country entirely is vastly greater than the burden of leaving a state
or a locality or simply choosing some new option in the private sector.6
While your consent may not be perfect when you vote with your feet in the
federal system, or even when you choose within a private sector, it is at
least a much more meaningfully consensual choice than decisions you make
at the ballot box.
Perhaps there is no way to achieve completely consensual government.
But we at least get closer to that ideal when we make more of our decision
by voting with our feet.
If we consider political freedom to be an important value and not just
something that we intone on the Fourth of July but do not really care about,
and to the extent we want to take the ideals of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence seriously, foot voting enables us to realize those ideals much more
fully than ballot-box voting alone. If we care about these values, we may
want to make more of our decisions by voting with our feet and fewer at the
ballot box. And one way we can do so is by de-centralizing political power
to lower levels of government so more decisions can be made by voting
with your feet and fewer at the ballot box.
IV. FOOT VOTING AND THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL IGNORANCE
In addition to giving people more meaningful choice, foot voting also
leads them to make better informed decisions than they would make by
voting at their ballot box. When we exercise political choice, it is important
we have genuine freedom, and exercise it in at least a reasonably informed
way.
A. The Problem of Rational Political Ignorance
One of the major shortcomings of ballot-box voting is the problem of
political ignorance. People may be voting, but most of the time they have
very little knowledge of what it is they are voting about. For example, right
before the crucial 2014 mid-term election that determined control of both
houses of Congress, a survey conducted by the Annenberg Public Policy
Center found that only 38% of Americans knew that the Republican party
controlled the House of Representatives, and a very similar number knew
6. For a strong critique of tacit consent theories based on residency, see Simmons, supra n. 5, at
95–100.
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that the Democrats controlled the Senate.7 It is difficult to evaluate the per-
formance of the two major parties, the Senate, and the House if you do not
know which party controls these chambers of the legislative branch.
This kind of widespread political ignorance is common. During our
last mid-term election in 2010, most voters said that the most important
issue they were considering was the state of the economy. Yet two-thirds of
the public did not even know that the economy had grown rather than
shrunk during the year right before the election.8
Another big issue that was much considered at that time was the gov-
ernment’s policies in response to the recession and the financial crisis, of
which the biggest of those policies was the TARP bailout enacted in the fall
of 2008. But only 34% of Americans knew former President Bush was the
president who had pushed TARP through Congress. More people than that
thought it was President Obama, so they weren’t even in a position to prop-
erly allocate responsibility for this major government policy.9
This ignorance is not limited to particular public policy issues. It also
extends to the basic structure of government and the way it operates. For
example, that same recent Annenberg poll found that only 36% of Ameri-
cans can even name the three branches of the federal government: the exec-
utive, the legislative, and, my personal favorite, the judicial.10
In addition, many surveys showed that the public has very little under-
standing of which government officials are responsible for which issues. If
you do not know that, it is actually hard to allocate responsibility for policy
successes and failures.11
Some may think that this must be a recent problem. Maybe it is the
fault of the millennial generation. Unlike previous generations, perhaps the
millennials are spending too much time surfing the Internet, watching
“twerking” videos, and following celebrities like Miley Cyrus. As a result,
they are not studying up on important political issues like we did in our day.
But the available survey data suggests that the problem of political igno-
rance is roughly similar to what it has been in the past. Today’s levels of
political knowledge are about the same as they were fifty to sixty years ago,
7. Ilya Somin, Annenberg Public Policy Center Survey Provides New Evidence of Widespread
Political Ignorance, Washington Post (Sept. 28, 2014) (available at http://perma.cc/C6ME-Z9FK (http://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/09/18/annenberg-public-policy-center-sur-
vey-provides-new-evidence-of-widespread-political-ignorance/)). The survey itself is available at The
Annenberg Public Policy Center, Americans Know Surprisingly Little about Government, Survey Finds,
http://perma.cc/4WBG-PW2F (http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/americans-know-surpris-
ingly-little-about-their-government-survey-finds/) (Sept. 17, 2014).
8. Somin, supra n. 1, at 21.
9. Id. at 22.
10. Annenberg Public Policy Center, supra n. 7.
11. Somin, supra n. 1, at 100–102.
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in the early days of modern public opinion polling. It is, however, striking
that political knowledge levels have stagnated even as educational attain-
ment has greatly increased and even as the Internet and other modern tech-
nologies make more data more easily available than probably ever before in
human history.
It is even the case that IQ scores have gone up over the last 50 years.12
It is often suggested that the younger generation must be dumber than their
elders.13 But it isn’t true. IQ scores have actually risen. The millennial gen-
eration may not be the best informed generation we have ever had, but they
may well be the most intelligent generation. But that intelligence, for the
most part, has not been used to acquire more political knowledge. It has
instead been used for other purposes.
It is in fact rational for both millennials and the rest of us to behave
that way most of the time for the very reason I noted earlier. The chance
that your vote will make a difference in an election is infinitesimally small.
Therefore, it is irrational to spend more than a tiny amount of time paying
attention to political information if your only reason for doing so is to be a
better voter. Economists call this “rational ignorance.”14 When there is little
or no benefit to acquiring more information, it makes sense to devote your
time to other sorts of activities that are more meaningful and more likely to
have an actual effect.
Obviously, there are people who learn about things even though they
have very little chance of affecting the outcome. Consider sports fans.
Sports fans love to learn about their favorite team and also to cheer for it
and against its rivals. They therefore learn a great deal about their team and
its opponents, even though they recognize the reality that their actions have
very little chance of affecting the outcome of games.
There are people who acquire political knowledge for much the same
reasons as sports fans acquire sports knowledge. In my book, I call them
“political fans”: people who follow politics not because it makes them bet-
ter voters but because they find it interesting and entertaining.15 They enjoy
cheering on their favorite political team—a party, an ideology, or some-
times an interest group or the like. Such political fans generally know much
more about politics than the average voter, and the more interested you are
in politics, the higher your level of political knowledge. Indeed, interest in
12. James R. Flynn, Are We Getting Smarter? Rising IQ in the Twenty-First Century 6 (Cambridge
U. Press 2012) (noting that average American IQ rose 15 points during the last half of the twentieth
century).
13. See e.g. Mark Bauerlein, The Dumbest Generation (Penguin Group 2008).
14. The theory was introduced by Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy ch. 13
(HarperCollins 1957). For a detailed discussion, see Somin, supra n. 1, at ch. 3.
15. Somin, supra n. 1, at 78–79.
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politics is the most powerful predictor of how much you know about politi-
cal issues, more so even than education or income or race or gender or any
other variable that we can put in a regression equation.16
There is nothing wrong with being a sports fan or a political fan. I am
some of both myself. When I am not speaking at academic conferences, I
spend a lot of time watching my favorite Boston sports teams and cheering
on the Red Sox, Patriots, Celtics, and Bruins. So I have no problem with
sports fans. I don’t necessarily have a problem with political fans, either.
But when you are acquiring information for the purpose of enhancing your
fan experience, often that objective is very much at odds with the objective
of seeking the truth.
Think about the way that sports fans react to new information that
reflects badly on their favorite team. For instance, let’s say that a referee
makes a call that goes against the team. The fan’s reaction is usually some-
thing like, “That was a terrible call! The ref must be blind, or perhaps he is
on the take.” On the other hand, if the referee makes a call in favor of the
fan’s team: “Well, of course that was a correct call. How could it possibly
have gone the other way?”
This is exactly how political fans react to new political information.
Numerous studies show that they tend to discount or completely ignore new
information that counts against their preexisting political views. On the
other hand, if the information counts in their favor, they tend to overvalue
its significance.17
It’s even the case that the more you are a political fan, the stronger
your interest in politics, the more you tend to talk about politics only with
other fans of the same side of the political spectrum. If you are a liberal
Democrat, you tend to talk about politics only with other liberal Democrats.
If you are a conservative Republican, with other Republicans, and so on.18
Similarly, people who are strong political fans tend to follow political
news only in media that has the same viewpoint.19 If you are a conservative
Republican, you may very well watch Fox News. If you are a liberal Demo-
crat, perhaps you follow NPR or the New York Times.
All of this is highly irrational behavior if the goal of learning about
politics is to get at the truth. As John Stuart Mill famously pointed out, if
you are a real truth seeker, you should actively seek out viewpoints that are
different from your own: “He who knows only his own side of the case
knows little of that.”20 Those information sources are more likely to give
16. Id. at 82–84.
17. See Id. at 79–81 (summarizing the evidence).
18. Id. at 81.
19. Id. at 81.
20. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 36 (David Spitz ed., Norton 1975).
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you facts and arguments that you haven’t heard of previously. If, however,
your goal is not to get at the truth but something else, such as enhancing
your political fan experience or having the psychological gratification of
having your preexisting views reinforced, then all of this actually is very
rational.
Economist Bryan Caplan calls this “rational irrationality.”21 When the
goal of acquiring information is something other than getting at the truth, it
is rational to be highly biased in your choice of information sources, and the
way that you evaluate the information that you learn. You can thereby
achieve the goal for which you sought out the information. But at the same
time, you actually diminish your chance of achieving the goal of getting at
the truth and becoming a better voter.
The natural reaction of many people to hearing about the problem of
political ignorance is that we must be able to solve it by somehow raising
people’s political knowledge, perhaps through education. In my book, I dis-
cuss at some length why I think this is actually unlikely to happen.22
I will not go into this issue in detail here. I will mention, however, that
it is striking that educational attainment has risen enormously over the last
50 to 60 years, yet political knowledge levels have stagnated.23 This sug-
gests, at the very least, that increasing knowledge through education is a
much tougher proposition than we might think.
Precisely because it is not rational for people to acquire much political
information, they have little incentive to use the education system for that
purpose. It is also the case that government itself has little incentive to use
education to inform people about politics as opposed to indoctrinating them
in the views held either by the majority of the public or by powerful interest
groups.24
B. Limitations of Information Shortcuts
Some scholars argue that we do not need to worry much about political
ignorance because people can use information shortcuts to get around it.25
They can use small bits of information to substitute for larger bodies of
knowledge that they don’t know. There are many different “shortcut” argu-
ments of this kind. Here, I will discuss only one, which has the strongest
21. Bryan Caplan, The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies ch. 5
(Princeton U. Press 2007); Bryan Caplan, Rational Ignorance vs. Rational Irrationality, 54 Kyklos 3, 3
(2001).
22. Somin, supra n. 1, at ch. 7.
23. Id. at 171–173.
24. Id. at 173–175.
25. For a survey and critique of shortcut theories, see Id. at ch. 4.
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support, and exemplifies the weaknesses of the others: retrospective vot-
ing.26
The idea of retrospective voting is this: maybe you do not need to
know much about politics or government to be a good voter. You just need
to ask yourself: are things going better under the rule of the incumbents, or
are they getting worse? As Ronald Reagan famously put it during the 1980
election, “Are you better off than you were four years ago?”  If you are
better off, then you can reelect the incumbents and reward them so that they
will continue their good policies. If, on the other hand, you’re worse off,
you can “vote the bastards out.” Then you can vote in a different set of
bastards to replace them. The new group of bastards will have incentives to
adopt better policies than the old ones because they will know what hap-
pened to their predecessors could also happen to them.
This mechanism can be useful in some cases. But it also exemplifies
the severe limitations of information shortcuts. One of them is that in order
to use the shortcuts effectively, you actually need some preexisting knowl-
edge. You need to know, for example, what issues the incumbents can actu-
ally have an effect on and which ones they cannot. If you don’t know that,
then you will end up rewarding and punishing the incumbents for things
that they didn’t actually cause, and this is actually exactly what happens in
most elections most of the time.
The biggest determinate of electoral outcomes usually is the recent
condition of the economy.27 Did it improve or get worse in the six months
or year or so right before the election? This occurs despite the fact the
political incumbents actually have very little control over short-term eco-
nomic trends. If they did control them, they would virtually never be de-
feated for reelection. As a result, voters routinely reward and punish incum-
bents for economic conditions they had little or no effect on.28
And this problem is not limited to just economic voting. It also extends
to other issues. For example, in farm states, there is evidence that the in-
cumbent governor and other officials are much less likely to be reelected if
there is a drought, even though these officials generally have no real control
over droughts.29
On the other hand, it is good news for local officials if sports teams
have won a championship recently.30 If one of the local teams has won, that
26. For a well-known defense of the retrospective voting shortcut, see Morris Fiorina, Retrospective
Voting in American National Elections (Yale U. Press 1981).
27. See generally Christopher Achen & Larry Bartels, Musical Chairs: Pocketbook Voting and the
Limits of Democratic Accountability (unpublished manuscript, Sept. 8, 2004) (available at http://
perma.cc/XL29-8QRM (https://www.princeton.edu/~bartels/chairs.pdf)).
28. Id.; see also Somin, supra n. 1, at 100–101.
29. Somin, supra n. 1, at 100–101.
30. Id. at 101.
10
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is great news if you are the mayor of the city where this happened, even
though usually the mayor has very little effect on the team’s chances of
winning. He does not usually play on the team. He doesn’t call plays. He
doesn’t coach. Yet he benefits anyway.
In addition, there is a second big problem with information shortcuts.
These theories implicitly assume that voters choose shortcuts based on
whether the shortcut will be effective at getting at the truth about politics. In
reality, they often use them for these purposes of rational irrationality—for
enhancing their fan experience or for reinforcing their preexisting views.
For instance, the idea of retrospective voting implicitly assumes voters
are using the condition of the world to evaluate the incumbents. If things
are getting better, they give the incumbent more credit. But often what hap-
pens is actually the opposite: voters’ preexisting conceptions about the in-
cumbents affect their view of the world. When there is a Democrat in the
White House, Republican-aligned voters tend to overestimate the rate of
inflation and unemployment. Democratic voters have the opposite bias.31
They think that things are better than they actually are when a Democrat is
in the White House but worse than they actually are when it is a Republi-
can.
Ultimately what we have here is a two-level problem of political igno-
rance. Most of the public is simply rationally ignorant. They do not pay
much attention to the issues, and therefore have very little understanding of
what they are voting on. There is a minority, the political fans, who know a
lot more. But those people tend to be highly biased in the way that they
evaluate the information that they learn, so they get much less truth-seeking
benefit from it than they otherwise might.
C. Informational Advantages of Foot Voting
What can we do about this problem? Making more of our decisions by
voting with our feet and fewer by voting at the ballot box can help. And it
can help for the very same reason that it can help us enhance our political
freedom. When you vote with your feet, you have much better incentives to
become informed about your decisions than when you vote at the ballot
box.
If you are like most people, you probably spent more time acquiring
relevant information and studying it the last time you bought a car or a TV
set than the last time you decided how to vote for President or for any other
political office. Is that because your TV is more important than who holds
the presidency or perhaps because it deals with more complex issues than
31. Id. at 104–105.
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those addressed by the White House? Unless you have a very unusual TV
set, I doubt it.
The real reason, for most people, is that when they made the decision
about the TV set, they knew that it would actually make a difference.
Whereas, on the other hand, when you decide to vote for Obama or Romney
or the Democrats as opposed to the Republicans, the chance that it will
make a real difference is infinitesimally small. Quite understandably, you
take that decision much less seriously than the one about the TV set, even
though it relates to a far more important outcome in terms of its impact on
the world.
This is true not just for your incentive to acquire relevant information
but for your incentive to evaluate that information in an unbiased way when
you do learn it. Consider the following social norm that I, at least, have run
into on occasion—perhaps you have as well: you are not supposed to argue
about politics in mixed company.
If you come up to someone at a social event and start explaining to
them why their political views are wrong, they probably will not react in a
very positive way. Even if you have devastating arguments and evidence
that they have never heard of before that completely destroy their position
and definitively explain why they were wrong, amazingly enough they
probably will not thank you for correcting their mistakes. Indeed, in many
cases they will be quite hostile and annoyed. If you want to be a popular
and well-liked person who gets invited to all the cool parties, you don’t
want to be the kind of person that is constantly criticizing and correcting
other people’s political views. Believe me. I know from painful personal
experience that is not the kind of reputation you want to have.
On the other hand, if you approach those very same people and give
them new information that is relevant to a foot-voting decision, such as
what car to buy or what community to live in, in general their reaction will
be quite different. They won’t always be grateful. But they usually will take
what you are saying seriously and probably will not react with the kind of
hostility that political arguments are often met with.
Why the difference? For most people, having their political views criti-
cized is all pain for very little gain. They suffer the pain and discomfort of
having their cherished beliefs criticized. That pain may actually be even
greater the stronger your arguments are. If you lose an argument, you feel
greater pain, because you might be embarrassed for seeming stupid or illog-
ical compared to your critic. On the other hand, the gain from having your
political views corrected is usually very small. At best, you might make a
better-informed decision with respect to a choice that is unlikely to make
any difference anyway.
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On the other hand, when you get new information that’s relevant to a
foot-voting decision, that’s news you can actually use. You might buy a
better TV, you might make a better choice about where you are going to
live, you might send your kids to a better school, and so forth. That will
lead you to pay closer attention and try harder to control your biases.
You won’t always succeed, of course. I certainly don’t claim that foot-
voters are all like Mr. Spock in Star Trek: completely rational and unbiased
in their evaluation of any new information they get. But, in general, we are
more logical and less biased when we evaluate foot-voting information than
when we evaluate political information. There is a lot of evidence that foot
voters do a better job of acquiring and using information, even under very
difficult conditions, than ballot-box voters do.32
A great example from American history is the case of African-Ameri-
cans in the Jim Crow-era South, a population that was severely oppressed.33
Most of them had very low levels of education, and southern state govern-
ments actually deliberately tried to keep them ignorant of how conditions
for African-Americans were relatively less bad in the North and West.
Nonetheless, millions of African-Americans did learn the relevant informa-
tion and did migrate to other parts of the country, thereby significantly im-
proving their situations. Sadly, it fell far short of putting an end to racist
oppression. But it did at least manage to make their situation significantly
better than it would have been otherwise. It is a dramatic example of people
successfully finding relevant information for foot voting even under highly
adverse conditions.
Another good example is the movement of immigrants in the 19th and
early 20th century from Europe and Asia to the United States. Many of
these people were also poorly educated. Many were illiterate. In those days,
they did not have the Internet. You couldn’t simply Google “economic con-
ditions in the United States” to find out that opportunities there were better
than in your home country. Nonetheless, tens of millions of people did ac-
quire the relevant information and acted accordingly.
Today, of course, the conditions for effective foot voting are far better
than they were a century ago. Moving costs are lower because transporta-
tion is faster and cheaper than in the past. In addition, people have more
education so they can more easily assimilate new information. Their IQ
scores are also higher than ever before. They have more raw intelligence.
And the Internet and other modern technology make information much eas-
ier to find than previously.
32. Id. at ch. 5.
33. I discuss this case in some detail in Somin, supra n. 1, at 128–135.
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Unfortunately, ballot-box voters have taken very little advantage of all
these developments. Although information may be easier to get, it is still
not rational for most people to spend a lot of time and effort learning it, in
order to vote at the ballot box.
On the other hand, when it comes to foot voting, there are much
stronger incentives to take advantage of these opportunities. In many ways,
therefore, foot voting can be even better today than it was 50 or 100 years
ago when the ancestors of most of the people who currently live in the
United States took advantage of it and successfully moved to this country.
V. POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS OF FOOT VOTING UNDER FEDERALISM
There are obviously important constraints and limitations of foot vot-
ing as well. Nothing is perfect, and certainly foot voting is not. In this sec-
tion, I will discuss a few of the constraints and limitations most often cited
in the literature.
The most obvious constraint is the problem of moving costs.34 If you
are going to vote with your feet by moving to a different state, that can be
costly, not just in terms of money you spend to actually move. You might
have to give up your job. You might lose ties to family or friends. I know of
people who moved, and then their girlfriends or boyfriends ended up break-
ing up with them as a result. That is a genuine cost, and a real problem that
might limit your ability to vote with your feet or may even make it impossi-
ble.
But the problem is not as severe as people often think it is. It has not
prevented some 43% of Americans from making an interstate move at least
once in their lifetime; almost two-thirds of Americans have, at the very
least, made a move within a state.35
To the extent that moving costs are a genuine problem, it is actually
one that justifies greater decentralization than we might want otherwise.
Moving from one state to another is cheaper than leaving the nation en-
tirely. And moving from one locality to another within the same state is
usually cheaper than moving to a different state.
If the issue in question is decided in the private sector and not through
government, often you can vote with your feet without any significant mov-
ing costs at all. You can simply live in the same place you lived in before
but switch service providers. For example, you can enroll your children in a
different private school, without moving to a different community, as is
usually the case if you wish to shift to a different government-owned
34. For a more extensive discussion of the problem of moving costs, see Somin, supra n. 1, at
144–145.
35. Id. at 144.
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school. Often, the best way to deal with the problem of moving costs is to
reduce those costs by decentralizing further.
A second standard argument against foot voting is the problem of the
race to the bottom.36 Perhaps people can vote with their feet. But businesses
can do it too. And businesses are what state and local governments really
want to attract. They are the ones that pay taxes. Thus, in a world of foot
voting, state and local governments might cater to the interests of busi-
nesses in ways that are detrimental to the rest of us.
This argument is often advanced in the area of environmental regula-
tion.37 Businesses want to be able to pollute as much as they want. In order
to attract them in, state and local governments will reduce or eliminate envi-
ronmental regulations. That may be good for the businesses, but it will be
terrible for everyone else. Ordinary people will have choices, perhaps. But
most of them will be places where the air is unbreathable and the water is
undrinkable and things are generally awful. The foot-voting opportunities
might then be illusory for everybody but business interests and perhaps the
very wealthy.
This race to the bottom argument does apply in certain instances. But,
for the most part, I think it is greatly overblown. It ignores several impor-
tant things. One is that state and local governments do not just want to
attract businesses. They want to attract individual taxpayers as well. And
taxpayers care about things like environmental quality. They are less likely
to want to move to an area where the air is difficult to breathe or the water
is undrinkable or the environment is generally terrible. Other things equal,
they prefer areas where the environment is in good shape, like here in Mis-
soula, Montana. That is actually attractive to people looking to move, peo-
ple who provide tax revenue. And state and local governments, when they
compete with each other, are sensitive to that consideration.
Even many businesses actually want good environmental conditions
because they want to be in places where the sorts of people they wish to
hire want to live. If the air is unbreathable or the community is otherwise
environmentally degraded, workers may not want to live there. At the very
least, businesses will have to pay wage premiums to make up for the fact
that the community is undesirable. Other things equal, they would prefer
not to have to do that.
Obviously, there are tradeoffs here. Some types of pollution are also
environmentally productive. We would not want to reduce pollution to zero.
But, in general, under competitive conditions, the state and local govern-
36. I address this issue in greater detail in id. at 145–147.
37. See e.g. Kirsten Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “to
the Bottom”? 48 Hastings L.J. 271, 274 (1997).
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ments have to weigh these things in a reasonable way. They are unlikely to
simply say “let’s allow as much pollution as possible and not care about the
consequences to anything else.” From a competitive point of view, that is
not going to be a good strategy for most communities. In some ways it is
desirable that there be a diversity of environmental regulation levels, be-
cause people vary in the extent to which they are willing to trade income for
environmental quality or for other government services. It is reasonable that
there be options that people can choose from on that basis. They can
thereby exercise their political freedom.
A third often-advanced objection to foot voting is one that has long
been a great stain on the reputation of American federalism.38 That is, the
association between federalism and the oppression of unpopular minorities,
particularly racial and ethnic minorities. Historically, state and local gov-
ernments have tended to persecute African-Americans and other minorities.
That has understandably led to the emergence of a conventional wisdom
that holds that decentralization harms minorities, whereas concentration of
power in the hands of the federal government is beneficial to their inter-
ests.39 If we decentralize power and allow people to vote with their feet,
maybe that would be good for white males. But it could be terrible for
unpopular minority groups because it would just give the state and local
governments free rein to abuse them.
There is some validity to this concern. There is no doubt that state and
local governments do have a long history of abusing various minority
groups, particularly racial minorities, but certainly not exclusively. But the
conventional wisdom about the relationship between federalism and minori-
ties also has severe flaws. One thing it tends to ignore is that the federal
government also has a long record of abusing minorities.40 Before the Civil
War, the federal government did a lot more to promote slavery than it ever
did to constrain it. Between Reconstruction and the Civil Rights Movement,
the federal government also tended to do more to promote racial segrega-
tion than to restrict it. The one part of the continental United States that was
completely under federal control throughout that period was the District of
Columbia. And the District of Columbia was just as segregated as the
southern states. On the same day that the Supreme Court decided Brown v.
Board of Education,41 they also decided Bolling v. Sharpe,42 which dealt
38. This brief discussion of the minority oppression objection to political decentralization draws on
my more extensive analysis in Somin, supra n. 1, at 147–150; and Somin, supra n. 2, at 98–102.
39. For a good summary of that conventional wisdom, see Douglas Laycock, Protecting Liberty in
a Federal System: The US Experience, in Patterns of Regionalism and Federalism: Lessons for the UK
121–145 (Jo¨rg Fedtke & Sir Basil S. Markesisinis eds., Hart Publishing 2006).
40. For a summary of this record and discussion of its implications, see Somin, supra n. 2, at
99–101.
41. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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with racial segregation in D.C. schools. Washington, D.C. was very similar
to the South in that respect.
The point is not simply that the federal government also often had a
bad record. At various times in American history, unpopular minorities, in-
cluding racial minorities, would have been even worse off with unitary con-
trol over policy than they were under federalism. Had there been a unitary
policy on slavery at the time of the Founding it probably would have meant
slavery everywhere, because only one state, Massachusetts, had abolished
slavery up to that point.43
Similarly, had there been a unitary policy on segregation between the
late 19th century and, say, around 1940, it very likely would have looked
more like the policy in the South than the policy in the North for various
reasons, but you can see some example of what it might have looked like
based on what happened in D.C. and also in some federally controlled terri-
tories as well.
In addition, during these periods, minorities to some degree were able
to benefit from the federal system by having the opportunity to vote with
their feet. As I mentioned earlier, African-Americans were able to vote with
their feet and leave the South. That, to some extent, helped alleviate their
oppression. It certainly did not fully solve their problems. But it made their
situation less bad than it would have been otherwise, and less bad than it
likely would have been under a unitary national policy on racial issues.
Today, in many ways, minorities have greater leverage and influence
over state and local governments than has often been true in past history, as
emphasized in important recent work by Heather Gerken of Yale Law
School.44 For instance, one of the main reasons for the impressive success
of the movement for gay and lesbian rights over the last twenty to thirty
years is that policy on most of the issues of concern to them was de-central-
ized. They could first make gains in those state and localities that were
relatively more favorable to them, and then those gains spread elsewhere. If
we had had a unitary national policy on same-sex marriage, we would not
today have numerous states that have adopted it. And we probably would
not be talking about the possibility of the United States Supreme Court
making same-sex marriage a right that applies nationally.
I am not contending that the opposite of the conventional wisdom is
true: that de-centralization is always and everywhere good for unpopular
minorities. That would be too strong a claim, and cannot be justified by the
42. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
43. Somin, supra n. 2, at 99.
44. See e.g. Heather K. Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, 24 Democracy 37 (Spring 2012)
(available at http://perma.cc/HEA4-7RUS (http://www.democracyjournal.org/24/a-new-progressive-fed-
eralism.php?page=1)).
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available evidence. But I am suggesting that the traditional view that de-
centralization is bad for minorities is incorrect. We need a more nuanced
approach to the issue. At the very least, it is not a valid general argument
against enhancing foot voting through increasing political decentralization.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
In the last part of this lecture, I would like to briefly summarize the
implications of all of this for constitutional federalism and for judicial re-
view. One big implication is that if we want to enhance people’s ability to
vote with their feet, so as to increase their political freedom and diminish
the problem of political ignorance, we should de-centralize political power
to lower levels of government. That way, more issues can be decided
through foot voting as opposed to ballot-box voting. That, in turn, strength-
ens the case for judicial review of federalism issues—for judicial enforce-
ment of limitations on the power of the federal government.45
This also has implications for the longstanding debate over the scope
of judicial review more generally. Perhaps the most common objection to
strong judicial review is the claim that it is anti-democratic because
unelected judges are setting aside the will of the people as expressed by
their elected representatives. Judicial review is suspect because it undercuts
political freedom, as expressed through ballot-box voting. This is the so-
called “countermajoritarian difficulty.”46 But once we recognize that in
many ways voting with your feet is a better way of exercising political
freedom than voting at the ballot box, then it may be that judicial decisions
that impose limitations on the power of the federal government actually
enhance our political freedom more than they detract from it.
Political ignorance is also relevant here. It raises serious questions
about whether the laws that judges strike down genuinely represent the will
of the people. In a world of widespread public ignorance, it turns out that
many of the laws the judges might invalidate are ones that the public either
does not know about at all or has very little understanding of their effects.
Thus, decisions striking down such laws are less countermajoritarian than
we usually assume.47
45. For a more detailed discussion, see Somin, supra n. 1, at 165–169.
46. For a discussion of the countermajoritarian difficulty and its major role in constitutional theory,
see Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, Part Five, 112 Yale L.J. 153 (2002).
47. See Somin, supra n. 1, at ch. 6; Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty: A New Perspective on the “Central Obsession” of Constitutional Theory, 89 Iowa L. Rev.
1287 (2004).
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On the other hand, judicial decisions that limit the power of the central
government enable people to make more decisions by voting with their feet.
Those issues can thereby be addressed in a framework where individuals
can make more meaningful and better-informed choices.
VII. CONCLUSION
Foot voting in a system of de-centralized federalism can enhance our
political freedom by enabling us to make decisive choices about what laws
we wish to live under. It can also help ensure that we make those decisions
in a better-informed way.
None of this proves that we should have the maximum possible
amount of judicial review. In deciding how much judicial review is optimal,
there are many other issues that need to be considered other than political
ignorance, the countermajoritarian difficulty, and the advantages of foot
voting. It also does not mean that we should have the maximum possible
degree of political de-centralization. Many other issues must be considered
as we weigh the appropriate size and centralization of government.
Even if you read my book and agree with all of its arguments, you still
might not favor as much de-centralization and limitation of government
power as I do. But if you take political freedom and political ignorance
seriously, you should support more de-centralization and tighter limits on
federal government power than you yourself would be in favor of in a world
where political ignorance was not a serious problem or one where ballot-
box voting was somehow a more meaningful exercise of political freedom
than it actually is.
More generally than that, I think foot voting and political freedom are
issues that we haven’t given enough consideration to in debates over feder-
alism constitutional theory. In my work over the last several years, I have
tried to plug some of the holes in the literature. But there is a lot more work
to be done on these vital issues.
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